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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to explore the dynamics between China’s onshore spot foreign exchange 
market and the offshore RMB non-deliverable forward (NDF) market before and after the 
reforms in exchange rate regime and foreign exchange market structures around July 21, 
2005. Developments in the two markets are reviewed and daily closing rates of both markets 
are examined. The Johansen co-integration test finds a strong co-integrating relationship 
between the onshore spot rate and the NDF rate and a two-way Granger causality is detected. 
An augmented GARCH formulation is employed to model the inter-market mean and 
volatility spillover effects. Evidence of strong mean spillover effects in both directions is 
observed but no significant volatility spillover is identified. 
 
  
II 
 
Preface 
 
A teacher affects eternity: he can never tell where his influence stops. 
~ Henry Adams 
 
This thesis can never be finished without the supervision of Dr. Roger Hammersland, a great 
supervisor and friend. I’d like to express my utmost gratitude to him for his patient guidance, 
earnest help and constant encouragement, for inspiring my interest in econometric works and 
for believing in me, to all of which I’ll always be indebted.  
 
Professor Zhang Jikang at Fudan University in China led me into the research field in 
China’s foreign exchange market. I can never measure the influence he has on me for being 
what he is, and neither can I measure the pain that the loss of him has caused. May he rest in 
peace! 
 
I’d also like to thank my fiancé for taking good care of me and offering endless support 
when I was busy working on this thesis. 
 
Finally, to my parents who teach me about dignity, courage and hope, who always stand up 
for me during times of difficulties and whom I can always turn to for advice and selfless love, 
this thesis is for you! 
 
  
III 
 
Contents 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. I 
PREFACE .............................................................................................................................. II 
CONTENTS ......................................................................................................................... III 
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
2. FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA ..................... 5 
2.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET .......................... 5 
2.2 TRADING MECHANISM AND MARKET ACTIVITY: 1994-2004............................................. 8 
2.3 NEW REFORM MEASURES SHORTLY BEFORE AND AFTER JULY 21, 2005 ......................... 16 
2.4 RMB NDF MARKET: DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS ........................................ 24 
3. MEAN AND VOLATILITY SPILLOVER EFFECTS BETWEEN RMB NDF 
AND ONSHORE SPOT MARKET .................................................................................... 28 
3.1  METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 28 
3.2  DATA, INTEGRATION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ...................................................... 31 
3.3 CO-INTEGRATION AND CAUSALITY ................................................................................ 36 
3.4 SPILLOVER EFFECTS BETWEEN NDF AND SPOT MARKETS .............................................. 43 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 49 
REFERENCES/LITERATURE .......................................................................................... 51 
APPENDIX 1: FIGURES AND TABLES .......................................................................... 54 
APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS .................................................................. 58 
 
  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
On July 21, 2005, China’s central bank announced a reform of RMB exchange rate regime 
featuring a 2% appreciation of RMB against US dollar and a basket peg
1
. In spite of its 
limited success in achieving enough flexibility in the exchange rate regime and in fending off 
speculations on the further appreciation of the Chinese currency, this reform has indeed in 
many ways changed market behavior. Shortly before and after that reform, a series of reform 
measures was carried out in the onshore foreign exchange market broadening market access, 
diversifying trading products and transforming trading mechanisms. These measures have 
been able to lessen the degree of exchange rate rigidity, improve the market structure, restore 
the previously distorted supply and demand mechanism, render the ―market‖ a more 
important role in exchange rate determination and not least, subject the formerly insulated 
domestic foreign exchange market to influences from other markets. Among them, the RMB 
non-deliverable forward (NDF) market
2
 is an obvious candidate.   
 
Speculative interests in the appreciation of RMB has injected huge liquidity into the RMB 
NDF market and boosted turnover from an average daily level of around $ 50 million to about 
$ 200 million in early 2003 (Ma et al., 2004). Even though the offshore NDF market and 
onshore spot market have been divided by strict capital control measures and have seen many 
differences in their operations (see relevant discussion in chapter 2), the similarity of the 
underlying asset that they trade, the increasing participation in the NDF market by domestic 
institutions and certain degree of inter-market capital as well as information flows made 
possible by the reforms has made the topic of exploring market dynamics between the two 
markets extremely interesting and feasible.   
 
Transmission of price and volatility among financial markets is not an unfamiliar topic in the 
literature, probably inspired by the contagion across different markets during the Asian 
financial crisis and the apparent increasing integration of international financial markets. A 
substantive body of literature has studied the price and volatility spillover effects between 
                                                 
1 A more precise expression should be: determine the exchange rate level ―with reference to‖ a basket of 
currencies so that the central bank can still have some discretion with respect to the determination of exchange 
rate.  
2 A formal definition of the NDF market will be given in chapter 2.  
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different market locations and research has mainly focused on three types of financial 
markets: the equity market, money market and foreign exchange market.  
 
Many studies find an interdependence of price changes and volatility across international 
stock markets (Eun and Shim, 1989; King and Wadhwani, 1990; Hamao et al., 1990; Lin et al., 
1994) and some have focused on volatility and price change spillover effects across developed 
markets and emerging markets (Hu et al., 1997; Liu and Pan, 1997; Wei et al., 1995; Park and 
Fatemi, 1993). Hamao et al. (1990) modeled the transmission mechanisms of the conditional 
first and second moments in common stock prices across Tokyo, London and New York stock 
markets, utilizing the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (ARCH) approach and 
observed price volatility spillovers from the New York to Tokyo, London to Tokyo, and New 
York to London market.  
 
In research concerning the money market, a lot of efforts have been dedicated to exploring the 
transmission between interest rate series in domestic markets and offshore markets and 
structural changes in the direction of causality have been observed by many. For the US dollar 
markets, innovations in domestic interest rates are found to lead offshore Eurodollar markets 
in the earlier periods (Kaen and Hachey, 1983; Hartman, 1984; Swanson, 1988) but reversed 
causality has been strengthened over the years (Fung and Isberg, 1992). Lo, Fung and Morse 
(1995), studying interest rate transmission between the Euroyen market and the Japanese 
domestic CD market, has found a co-integration relationship between the two interest rate 
series and strong feedback effects in both directions in more recent years. 
 
The foreign exchange market has also received considerable attention in this direction. In 
their seminal work, Engle, Ito and Lin (1990), using meteorological analogies, tested the 
hypotheses of ―heat wave‖ or existence of only country-specific autocorrelation in volatility 
and that of ―meteor shower‖ which supports interregional volatility spillovers. Applying a 
GARCH model to intra-daily yen/dollar exchange rate in the New York market and Tokyo 
market, they soundly rejected the ―heat wave‖ hypothesis and reported evidence in favor of a 
spillover effect in volatility between different market locations. Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) 
based their study on hourly data of four major exchange rates across different world markets. 
They confirmed the meteor shower hypothesis and identified the presence of a seasonal 
ARCH term which suggested some heat wave characteristics. Melvin and Peiers (2003) has 
also found a co-existence of statistically significant ―heat-wave‖ (own-region) effects and 
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―meteor shower‖ (inter-regional spillovers) effects but has argued that ―heat-waves‖ are more 
significant economically (larger in magnitude) than ―meteor showers‖ and thus more 
important. Park (2001) turned to the Korean markets for potential price changes and volatility 
spillover effects between the domestic Won-Dollar market and the NDF market utilizing daily 
closing rates. He divided the sample data into the two subsets of the pre-reform period and 
post-reform period according to Korea’s foreign exchange rate system in December 19973. He 
too adopted the GARCH formulation and found a unidirectional mean spillover effect from 
the spot to the NDF market in the pre-reform period but a reversed relationship after the 
reform. With respect to volatility spillovers, both directions existed in the pre-reform period 
but in the post-reform period, only the volatility of the NDF market seemed to influence the 
spot market and not vice versa.  
 
As can be seen in the discussion above, the application of the ARCH/GARCH family of 
statistical models to describe foreign exchange rate data is pervasive in the literature (See also 
Domowitz and Hakkio, 1985; Engle and Bollerslev, 1986; Diebold and Nerlove, 1989; 
Hodrick, 1989). Information clustering in the arrival process of news or market participants’ 
lagged response may well explain this ARCH behavior of exchange rates. Traders in the 
market usually have heterogeneous prior expectations and private information
4
, so after a 
shock or incoming of new information, they still have to take some hours of trading to resolve 
this prior expectational difference, causing a continuation of volatility. 
 
Inspired by previous literature on inter-market transmission of price changes and volatility as 
well as recent reforms in China’s foreign exchange market, this thesis will study the dynamics 
between China’s onshore spot market and the RMB NDF market. Chapter 2 will review the 
developments in the two markets and chapter 3 will constitute the empirical study of market 
inter-relations. Following the line of Park (2001), daily closing rates in the two markets are 
used and divided into a pre-reform period (January 4, 1999-July 20, 2005) and a post-reform 
period (July 21, 2005-March 30, 2006) but only the post-reform period will be the focus of 
our research
5
. Preliminary statistics describing the dataset will be provided, followed by 
econometric tests for stationarity, co-integrated relationships and directions of causality. An 
AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) model for the NDF rate change and an AR (1)-GARCH_t (1, 1) model 
                                                 
3
 This reform installed a free-floating exchange rate regime and deregulated the foreign exchange market. 
4
 Existence of private information and heterogeneous beliefs constitutes an important part of market 
microstructure theory. See Sarno and Taylor (2001). 
5 See later sections for an explanation.  
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for the spot rate change will be employed to test for potential across market mean and 
volatility spillover effects. Mean spillovers from the spot to the NDF market and from the 
NDF to the spot market are strongly significant but no obvious volatility spillover in either 
direction emerges in the post-reform period. Chapter 4 gives the summary and concludes. The 
findings of this thesis can not only provide further evidence of the price and volatility 
transmission mechanism across financial markets, especially for the onshore and offshore 
market, but also have important policy implications for the policy-making practice in China’s 
foreign exchange market.  
 
For market participants, increasing interests of domestic institutions to participate in the NDF 
market for risk-hedging (since they’re exposed to greater exchange rate risks after the regime 
change) or speculation has necessitated the knowledge of cross-market relations to better 
manage their portfolios and control risk exposures. For the central bank, after the new 
reforms, the domestic foreign exchange market is no longer insulated from influences from 
the offshore market or overseas market and the central bank no longer has the kind of absolute 
control as under the old fixed exchange rate regime, so a thorough understanding of inter-
market relations will be crucial to avoid potential contagion of violent rate movements from 
the highly speculative offshore market to the domestic spot market. In addition, the inter-
market relations will be even strengthened when the capital control measures phase out and 
cross-border capital flows become more frequent, thus the underlying risk to financial 
stability can not be overlooked. The central bank should ponder on the sequence of financial 
deregulations to minimize the risk brought by inter-market spillover effects. As will be shown 
in chapter 2, an onshore forward market has just been established. How to deal with the co-
existence of these two forward markets and let the onshore market lead instead of being 
dominated by the NDF market is also an issue on the authorities’ agenda.  
 
The empirical work in this thesis has been performed using GiveWin 2.02/PcGive. 
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2. Foreign exchange market organizations in China 
Explanations of the empirical results about mean and volatility spillovers between the onshore 
spot and offshore forward market as well as important policy implications can’t be achieved 
without a sound knowledge of the foreign exchange rate regime and foreign exchange market 
organizations in China. In chapter 2, we will begin with a review of the historical 
development of China’s foreign exchange market and go on to examine the institutional 
framework governing the market as well as the market structures. A discussion of the 
development and characteristics of the RMB NDF market follows and at the end of the 
chapter, differences and connections between the two markets will be explored.  
 
2.1 Historical development of China’s foreign exchange market6 
2.1.1  Pre-1979:  Strict Central Control 
Before 1979, China had a highly centralized regime governing the supply, demand and 
allocation of foreign exchange. All foreign exchange earnings (mainly export proceeds) had to 
be surrendered to the state-owned banks and the central bank, i.e. the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC). All foreign exchange expenditures (i.e., for imports or non-trade purposes) had to be 
approved under the confines of the national foreign exchange plan which leaned toward the 
state sector.
7 
There was no market element in the formation of the exchange rate which was 
fixed to the British pound from 1952, then to a basket of international currencies from 1973. 
 
2.1.2  1979-1993:  foreign exchange Retention and Swap 
Liberalization of foreign exchange use began in 1979 with an earnings retention scheme 
designed to encourage exports. Under this scheme, exporters were entitled to retain a share of 
their foreign exchange earnings, initially with respect to exports above some quota but from 
1998 according to the full measure of exports. From 1981 to 1984, exchange rates were set 
differentially for trade and non-trade activities
8
. 
 
                                                 
6
 China’s foreign exchange market is herein referred to as the onshore foreign exchange market.  
7 The foreign exchange plan was formulated by the State Planning Commission in consultation with the 
Ministries of Trade and Finance and the PBOC. (See Zhang, Z.C., 2003) 
8
 The exchange rate for trade activities was set at 2.8 RMB/USD while the official rate still stood at 1.5 
RMB/USD. This practice was abolished since January 1, 1985.   
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The first sign of an actual foreign exchange market in China appeared in October 1980 when 
retained foreign exchange claims became transferable, first through the swap service launched 
by the PBOC, then in provincial swap centers, and finally in an integrated nationwide swap 
market.
9
 The late 1980s saw the expansion of foreign exchange swap activity with the number 
of market participants increasing and swap exchange rates becoming more flexible. By the 
end of 1993, there were 108 local swap centers and 18 markets joined to the nationwide 
system. A mechanism for forming a market exchange rate had thereby been established in 
coexistence with an official pegged rate.   
 
The development of the swap market with its diversity of swap rates had its own problems, 
including discrimination, rent-seeking and unauthorized actions. Nevertheless, it acted as a 
transitional device to lay a foundation for the emergence of a true foreign exchange market in 
China. The 1979-1994 period also saw frequent adjustments of the official exchange rate
10
 
with a trend devaluation of RMB against US dollar. After the gradual devaluations of the 
official rate, the central bank was well prepared to unify the exchange rates and reform the 
exchange rate regime.   
 
2.1.3  1994 and Post-1994:  Compulsory Settlement on a Centralised Platform 
The year 1994 was a turning point in China’s foreign exchange reform. In that year, the 
system of foreign exchange retention and submission that had existed for 15 years was 
replaced with a compulsory settlement system under which foreign exchange earners were 
obligated to sell their foreign exchange to state banks while foreign exchange users could buy 
it subject to conditions. The ―single managed floating exchange rate regime based on market 
supply and demand‖ was adopted.  On 4 April 1994, the China Foreign Exchange Trading 
System (CFETS) began operation, signifying the launch of a unified national inter-bank 
foreign exchange market. The government’s foreign exchange management method was also 
adjusted to rely more on systematic economic and legal measures in contrast with the former 
command approach. New rules governing the purchase of foreign exchange by individuals for 
overseas visits, study or other personal needs took effect on 1 April.  These rules have been 
relaxed gradually over time with the upper limit on individual purchases raised to $8000
11
 
                                                 
9
 Despite the name, the swap market provided spot transactions only. 
10
 These adjustments were frequent, small and slow with mixed appreciation and depreciations but on the whole, 
RMB had been devalued against US dollar from the early 1979 level of 1.50 RMB/USD to 5.72 RMB/USD at 
the end of 1993. Six large official devaluations took place in 1981, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989 and 1990. 
11
 As of August, 2005. The limit has been revised to $ 20,000 per person/per year, coming into effect on May 1, 
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from an initial $600 per person/visit. The success of the 1994 reform enabled conditional 
convertibility of the RMB for current account related transactions and brought a real foreign 
exchange market into existence.  
 
Reform continued under the basic framework of the foreign exchange purchase and sale 
system after 1994.  In 1995, China ended the circulation of foreign exchange certificates
12
. In 
July 1996, the foreign exchange transactions of Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) were 
integrated into the foreign exchange purchase and sale system, allowing FIEs to buy foreign 
currency freely on the inter-bank market. On 27 November 1996, China formally notified the 
International Monetary Fund of the RMB’s convertibility under the current account. Qualified 
Chinese companies were allowed to open foreign exchange settlement accounts to retain a 
proportion of foreign exchange earnings from current account transactions in 1997. Bank of 
China was authorized to launch the forward foreign exchange purchase and sale business with 
its customers in 1997.  
 
The Asian financial crisis interrupted China’s aggressive reform timetable. A series of 
regulations were enacted and clarified by the PBOC to strengthen the responsibilities of the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) with respect to falsely obtaining foreign 
exchange, failing to surrender foreign exchange, illegal arbitrage and so on. The swap centers 
were closed on December 1, 1998, with all foreign exchange transactions thereafter integrated 
into the foreign exchange purchase and sale system. 
 
In 2001, trading in dollar-denominated B shares on China’s stock market was opened to 
Chinese nationals (having formerly been limited to foreign passport holders) with necessary 
currency exchange supported by CFETS. Trading in euros was introduced in April 2002.  
Then in October 2002, all enterprises that qualified for conducting international business or 
had regular foreign exchange incomes from current account transactions, were allowed to 
open foreign currency accounts for holding up to 20 percent of their previous year’s foreign 
exchange income.  Two-way trading was permitted from October 2003 with trading hours 
extended from half to full day. 2005 is another landmark in the development of China’s 
foreign exchange market abundant with policy initiatives. Eight foreign currency pairs started 
                                                                                                                                                        
2006. 
12
 Foreign exchange certificates (FEC) are notes equivalent in value to the RMB Yuan. Foreigners can exchange 
foreign currency into FECs and use them to make payments during their stay in China (They can not directly 
exchange foreign currency into RMB).  
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trading in the inter-bank market in May 2005. The RMB was revalued with a 2% appreciation 
against US dollar and the peg to the single US dollar was replaced with a reference to a basket 
of currencies in July 2005. The July 21 reform was followed by successive reform measures 
in August
13
 to enlarge the scope of forward transactions and swaps in the retail market, to 
invite non-financial enterprises and non-bank financial institutions to participate in the inter-
bank market, to add a quote-driven dealer market trading mechanism into the current auction 
market and to introduce inter-bank foreign exchange forward and swap trading. In addition, a 
long expected market maker system for USD/RMB trade was finally announced in November 
2005 based on the CFETS platform
14
.  
 
2.2 Trading mechanism and market activity: 1994-2004 
2.2.1 Market composition 
China’s foreign exchange market is composed of two parts: the inter-bank or wholesale 
market and the retail market (see Figure A.1.1 in Appendix 1). Major parties involved in the 
foreign exchange market are: 1. CFETS which functions as the trading platform for the inter-
bank market and is responsible for clearing the market and for providing the supervisory 
authorities with market information. 2. PBOC and SAFE as regulatory authorities: the PBOC 
authorized SAFE to regulate the inter-bank spot and forward markets and the retail market. 3. 
Designated foreign exchange banks and other non-bank financial institutions
15
 authorized by 
SAFE to engage in foreign exchange business. 4. Enterprises that earn and spend foreign 
exchange. 5. Individuals who have foreign exchange trading needs. The nature of the inter-
bank foreign exchange market is for designated foreign exchange banks to square their 
foreign exchange positions derived from retail foreign exchange business after maintaining an 
allowable foreign exchange working position
16
. Before the August 2005 reform, the inter-
bank market has been a centralized order-driven auction market making use of organized 
exchange trading and an electronic broking system while retail transactions have been carried 
out in an over-the-counter (OTC) market.  
 
CFETS: The Trading Platform 
                                                 
13
 Details of these policies can be seen in the ―Notice of the People's Bank of China on Accelerating the 
Development of the Foreign Exchange Market‖ which came out on August 8, 2005 on the central bank’s website: 
www.pbc.gov.cn 
14
 Details can be found on the State Administration of Foreign Exchange’s website: www.safe.gov.cn, November 
27, 2005 
15
 Non-financial enterprises weren’t allowed access until the August 2005 reform. 
16
 This allowable foreign exchange working position has to be verified and approved by SAFE. 
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CFETS is a membership-based foreign exchange trading platform with a nationwide real-time 
electronic trading system. With an ―auction market‖ trading mechanism similar to an 
electronic broker, members make back-to-back (anonymous) quotes on the trading platform 
through either on-site or distant trading terminals. The electronic trading platform 
automatically enables real-time matching of orders. The clearing function is integrated into 
the CFETS platform, providing members with centralized, two-way, netting/clearing of RMB 
and foreign currencies. 
 
This market infrastructure was originally put in place to serve the needs of the compulsory 
foreign exchange settlement system and to facilitate the PBOC’s absolute control of the 
market. But now it seems inevitable that a voluntary foreign exchange settlement system will 
be adopted, and the necessity for the CFETS to clear excess supply or demand will no longer 
exist. Thus the question is whether or not this inefficient non-market-oriented trading platform 
should be retained once there is no longer a need for centralized and compulsory settlement of 
foreign exchange.   
 
The pros and cons must be considered in order to make the decision. A trading platform such 
as the CFETS had its justifications in connection with a developing and fragile financial 
system.  Risk management and pricing is not well-developed in China. With a fragile banking 
industry and lack of bilateral credit lines, the exchange mode and automated trading system 
provided by the CFETS provides a centralized credit system to overcome the credit risk 
concerns.  
 
In addition, advances in telecommunications and information technology have already led to a 
large share of trading being snapped up by electronic brokers such as Electronic Broking 
Services Ltd.(EBS) and Reuters offering lower transaction costs and tighter spreads through 
the use of STP (Straight-Through-Processing) and CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement) as 
well as greater transparency in pricing. The CFETS platform functions similarly to electronic 
brokers and may fit the future trend in global foreign exchange markets.  
 
However as an administrative unit of the PBOC, the CFETS suffers from inefficiencies due to  
monopoly power and a non-market orientation. The CFETS is used by the central bank to 
control the market and is exposed to neither competition nor supervision by its members.   
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In summary, recent policy moves offer a clue that the central bank won’t easily let go of the 
CFETS as the trading platform in the inter-bank foreign exchange market. The existence of 
such a platform will ensure that further reforms in the foreign exchange market are carried out 
under the central bank’s scrutinization and enable the central bank to calculate order flow 
directly. In the meantime, the CFETS must undergo major transformations with respect to 
market-orientation, services offered, technology, efficiency, and risk management. The 
possible direction of reform will lean towards introducing new elements to the old platform so 
that China’s inter-bank market will become indeed a mixed market with a centralized auction 
market and a parallel dealer market for certain transactions. There’s a large chance that the 
CFETS will continue to function as a transaction and information market platform but it 
should become more independent of the central bank in the sense that it should spin off the 
current supervision responsibility administered by the central bank. 
 
2.2.2 Market activity 
Market Turnover: a shallow and narrow market 
Average daily turnover in China’s inter-bank foreign exchange market is very low compared 
to that on the world’s major markets (see Table 2.1). But China’s market is growing fast with 
daily turnover up by 177 per cent in 2004 relative to 2001.  
 
The small scale of China’s foreign exchange market is attributable in part to institutional 
factors. Restrictions on foreign exchange holdings of both commercial banks and the public 
significantly limit the development of the market. So too does concentration of foreign 
exchange trading among a few large banks that tend to balance trades internally, turning to the 
inter-bank market just once a day to re-establish their reserves at the allowable level. Indeed, 
until October 2003, buying and selling during the same trading session was prohibited. 
Market development is also inhibited by capital control measures and the limited scope of 
products and currencies. 
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Table 2.1:  Foreign Exchange Market Daily Average Turnover in Selected Markets, 1995-
2004 
(USD billion/day) 
 1995 1998 2001 2004 
China 0.26 0.21 0.30 0.83 
Hong Kong 90 79 67 102 
Japan 161 136 147 199 
Singapore 105 139 101 125 
United 
Kingdom 
464 637 504 753 
United States 244 351 254 461 
Source: CFETS, BIS Triennial Survey. 
Note: For markets other than China’s, daily averages are for the month of April and cover spot, forward and 
swap transactions. For China, volume is based on the entire year and pertains only to inter-bank spot 
transactions. 
 
The recent dramatic growth in China’s inter-bank market follows a sluggish start in the 1990s 
(see Figure 2.1). The years 1997 to 1999 actually showed a downturn from which the market 
did not re-emerge until 2001. With recovery of economic growth domestically, China’s 
admission to WTO and improvement in the foreign trade and investment balance, the market 
picked up momentum entering a period of fast growth from 2001 to 2004 with an average 
growth rate of 50.32%. Market turnover reached a new height of USD209 billion in 2004 with 
a daily average of USD830 million.  
 
The rising turnover on China’s inter-bank market coincided with rapid growth in balance of 
payments flows. Under the compulsory foreign exchange purchase and sale system, the inter-
bank market functions solely for banks to net out foreign exchange positions derived from 
retail trade. This retail trade is in turn driven by bank customer activity captured by the 
current and capital accounts transactions. In recent years, short-term capital inflows have 
played a major role in feeding the increase in supply of the RMB on the foreign exchange 
market, driven largely by expectations of an appreciation. 
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Figure 2.1:  Annual and Daily Average Turnover in China’s foreign exchange Market, 1994-
2004 
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Source: China Money, different issues from 2001-2005 
 
The July 2005 reform heralded reforms in the RMB exchange rate regime. With more 
flexibility in the exchange rate formation mechanism being introduced in the future, China 
will be expecting larger variations in its foreign exchange market. A small and shallow market 
is certainly no boon to smoothing exchange rate variations. This may add to authorities’ 
concern to allow further flexibility in the exchange rate regime and cause delay in the reform 
timetable; on the other hand, without a more flexible rate, a truly deep market is hard to be 
achieved.  
 
Market Segments: mainly a spot market dominated by RMB/USD trading 
 
China’s foreign exchange market is limited in product scope mainly to spot trading in US 
dollars. For a long time since its establishment, the inter-bank market offered only spot 
transactions. In August 2005, however inter-bank forward and swap transactions were 
introduced. In the retail market, the Bank of China (BOC) was allowed to offer forwards
17
 
                                                 
17
 Presently, forwards exist in eight currencies (US dollar, Hong Kong dollar, euro, yen, pound, Swiss franc, 
Australian dollar and Canadian dollar) and 14 different terms from seven days to 12 months. 
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beginning in 1997, with the other banks following suit after 2002. Foreign exchange swaps in 
the retail market wasn’t allowed until August 2005. 
From the inception of forward transactions in 1997, the Bank of China’s trading volume rose 
to a peak of USD11.5 billion in 2000 (see Figure 2.2). This growth reflected a need for 
businesses to hedge against currency risk during a period when the RMB was under pressure 
to depreciate in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Rather than devalue though, the PBOC 
responded to the crisis by tightening the floating band. This led to a highly stable relationship 
between the RMB and the US dollar. Under such conditions, the need to hedge risk 
diminished and the forward market contracted. In 2002, the BOC’s forward trading volume 
declined by about two-thirds from its peak .Since 2003, however, the market has rebounded 
driven by appreciation expectations and when more banks entered the business.  
 
Figure 2.2:  Retail Market Forward Foreign Exchange Trading 
(USD billion) 
Year 1997
Year 1998
Year 1999
Year 2000
Year 2001
Year 2002
Year 2003
Year 2004
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00 14.00 16.00 18.00 20.00
Forward trading
 
Source: Data for year 1997-2002 are from Bank of China Annual Reports while data for year 2003-2004 are 
estimates made by ZHANG Guang Ping, chief financial engineering specialist from Shanghai Futures Exchange. 
 
 
Compared with the global foreign exchange market, the lack of product range in the Chinese 
market restricts overall growth in market turnover and limits the functions of the market, 
especially the risk-hedging function. 
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China’s foreign exchange market is limited, too, by its trading concentration in the US dollar. 
When the inter-bank market was established in 1994, only the US dollar and Hong Kong 
dollar were traded. The yen was added in 1995 and the euro in 2002. Eight foreign currency 
pairs started spot trading in May 2005. The US dollar, however, remains the overwhelmingly 
dominant currency, accounting for 97.78% of total turnover in 2004.   
 
The high concentration in US dollar trading is not inconsistent with the important role the 
dollar plays in global trade and investment as a vehicle currency. Further, given the highly 
stable RMB/USD exchange rate, conducting their affairs in dollars allows those engaged in 
international business to minimize exchange risk. Having come to take stability of the 
exchange rate for granted, market participants do not net out their open positions immediately, 
but rather minimize transaction costs by netting out positions internally. Therefore, US dollar 
domination of the foreign exchange market is also a factor in the low level of overall market 
activity. 
 
The US dollar domination in China’s foreign exchange market reflects market participants’ 
dependence on the central bank to clear the market under the rigid exchange rate regime. Lack 
of motivation to hedge two-way exchange risks also has prevented participants from building 
up professional skills in foreign exchange risk management and has retarded the development 
of foreign exchange derivatives, which may turn out to be one of the most important 
fragilities when exit from the current peg brings in more variations in the rates. 
 
To sum up, China’s inter-bank foreign exchange market is currently mainly a spot market. 
The forward and swap markets have just emerged with trivial volume so far. Even with the 
introduction of eight foreign currency pairs in 2005, the domination of RMB/USD trading is 
unlikely to be changed in the near future. The lack of diversity with respect to transaction 
types restrains market turnover and limits liquidity. 
 
Market Participants and Concentration: restricted market entry and high concentration 
Though membership in the CFETS reached 366 by June 2005, market activity remained 
highly concentrated among a small number of banks. This contrasts with the diverse body of 
market participants in the global foreign exchange market which includes dealers and non-
financial entities as well as banks and non-bank financial institutions. The global foreign 
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exchange market has seen an increasing share of turnover being seized by trading between 
banks and other financial institutions which stood at 33% in 2004
18
.  
  
Table 2.2:  Market Concentration 
Measure Percentage 
C1 50.57% 
C2 64.70% 
C3 71.71% 
C4 76.14% 
C5 79.86% 
Note: C1 indicates the market share of the market participant with largest trading volume and C5 indicates the 
market share of the largest five participants. Calculation based on trading volume figures in China Money. 
 
China’s foreign exchange market is characterized by approaching monopoly especially on the 
buy side. Although nearly half of the CFETS’s 366 members are foreign banks, their trading 
volume amounts to only a small portion of the total. In 2004, top 5 market participants
19
 
covered nearly 80% of the total market trading (See table 2.2), all of them being domestic 
banks. These large banks are usually net sellers in the market with the rest of the participants 
being net buyers. The Bank of China itself is estimated to account for more than half of the 
net foreign exchange selling in 2002 (Wang, 2004). On the buy side, in the period from 1995 
to 2004, PBOC’s net purchase of foreign exchange accounted for 68 per cent of the total inter-
bank market turnover (Calculated from figure 2.3).  
 
                                                 
18
 See Bank for International Settlements (BIS), ―Triennial Central Bank Survey of foreign exchange and 
Derivatives Market Activity in 2001‖, www.bis.org, July 15, 2004 
19
 They are Bank of China, Agriculture Bank of China, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank and China International Trust & Investment Corporation (CITIC). 
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Figure 2.3:  PBOC Net Purchase of foreign exchange & Inter-Bank Market Turnover, 1995-
2004 
0
50
100
150
200
250
'95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04
USD bil
0
20
40
60
80
100
%
PBOC net purchase Inter-bank market turnover PBOC net purchase / market turnover
 
Source:  Shu Youdong, ―The Appreciation Pressure on RMB and the Releasing Measures‖, China Money, 
November 2001; Ernest H. Preeg, ―Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission‖, September 2003; "Central Bank Spends More Keeping Yuan Stable", www.chinaview.cn, March 
2005. 
 
In recent years, the PBOC has been obliged to undertake massive buying in the face of heavy 
supply pressure brought on by speculation of a RMB appreciation and a relatively high 
interest rate paid on RMB deposits. The result has been a rapid increase in official reserve 
assets to USD 875 billion at the end of March 2006.   
 
2.3 New reform measures shortly before and after July 21, 2005 
Shortly before
20
 and after the July 21 reform, a series of new reforms were introduced to 
improve foreign exchange market structures and to loosen capital controls.  
 
The reforms in the foreign exchange market mainly focused on three aspects: to broaden the 
market access, enrich market segments and to transform trading arrangements. Theoretically, 
these new reform measures can improve on the market structures in ways of increasing 
liquidity and enhancing market functions. Besides these foreign exchange market structural 
                                                 
20
 Referring to the launch of eight foreign currency pairs in May 2005. 
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changes, capital account liberalization were also pushed forward, partly to ease the 
appreciation pressure. These measures will leave domestic institutions as well as individuals 
with more freedom to acquire, transact and manage foreign currency and enlarge the scale of 
cross-border capital flows. With the new exchange rate regime and new parallel reforms in the 
foreign exchange market and capital account liberalization in place, the RMB exchange rate 
will be increasingly steered by market forces and the central bank and other market 
participants’ role in the foreign exchange market will be transformed. As a result, the 
domestic foreign exchange market will receive more foreign influences, become less insulated 
from and more integrated to overseas foreign exchange markets, including the RMB offshore 
market.    
 
2.3.1 Broaden Market Access 
Non-financial enterprises and non-bank financial institutions were granted access to the 
domestic inter-bank foreign exchange market in August 2005. As of March 2006, there are 
389 CFETS members, an increase of 23 compared with June 2005. Among the new 
participants, Sinochem Corporation became the first non-financial enterprise ever to enter the 
inter-bank market. Meanwhile, foreign banks continue to show a strong interest in China’s 
foreign exchange market and have become the leading force in reforming China’s foreign 
exchange market (see table 2.3).  
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Table 2.3: Number of institutions registered as participants in different market segments at the 
end of 2005 
 Number of total participants Number of foreign institutions 
Inter-bank spot market ( 
Members of CFETS)  
389 189 
   
Inter-bank forward market 68 52 
   
Foreign currency pairs 
trading 
52 24 
   
Forward purchase and sales 
(Retail Market) 
46 30 
   
Swap of RMB against 
foreign currencies 
7 0 
   
USD/RMB market makers 
in the quote-driven spot 
market 
13 5 
 Participant number is updated to March 2006 for the inter-bank spot market. 
 
With their rich experience of foreign exchange trading, sophisticated foreign exchange risk 
management skills, deep understanding of the international foreign exchange market practice 
and sufficient and amicable relationship with the Chinese authority, foreign institutions will 
become the pillar in new products trading and the nascent market segments, many of them 
playing the role of market makers
21
. Active participation and a gesture of goodwill to help 
develop China’s foreign exchange market can be seen as these foreign banks’ preemptive 
strategic move to build a competitive edge in RMB trading and to seek new sources of profit 
growth with the realization of their full access into China’s banking sector around the 
corner
22. No matter what their motives are, foreign banks’ presence in China’s foreign 
                                                 
21
 Market-making currently exists in the foreign currency pairs trading, inter-bank forward market and the quote-
driven system of the inter-bank spot market.  
22 As part of China’s WTO commitment, the domestic banking sector will be fully opened to foreign banks by 
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exchange market means potential technology spillovers to their domestic counterparts and can 
help jump-start the new foreign exchange market. But they will also make the domestic 
foreign exchange market more susceptible to foreign influences and facilitate foreign capital 
flows in and out of the market.  
 
With a combined export and import standing at USD1422.12 Billion in 2005
23
, non-financial 
enterprises, especially companies in the foreign trade business have every reason to become 
big players in the foreign exchange market. However, the long-term super stable exchange 
rate has caused inertia among Chinese enterprises to hedge against foreign exchange risks. 
Lack of foreign exchange risk management awareness and skills as well as cost concerns
24
 
may prevent small enterprises from being deeply involved in the inter-bank market. As a 
result, those actively involved will be large enterprises, at least in the beginning. These large 
enterprises have had a history of participating in the overseas foreign exchange market and 
especially the RMB offshore market. Once granted access to the domestic foreign exchange 
markets, their potential arbitrage activities will bring further integration of the domestic 
market with the offshore market.   
 
2.3.2 Enrich market segments 
Measures to enrich foreign exchange market segments mainly include
25
 adding 8 foreign 
currency pairs in the spot market and establishing an inter-bank forward market. This will 
enrich the original inter-bank market segment which only has spot transactions in four RMB 
related currency pairs, enhance the market functions and provide market participants with a 
new scope for investing their foreign exchange holdings as well as hedging against foreign 
exchange risks.  
 
 
Inter-bank forward market 
Establishing the inter-bank forward market is the key to making China’s foreign exchange 
market a truly functional market which can satisfy market participants’ risk hedging needs. 
Yet so far, the onshore forward market has not lived up to its expectations and has suffered 
from a low level of market activity (see table 2.4).  
                                                                                                                                                        
the end of 2006. 
23
 Data from the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China website, 2006-04-09 
24 54.7% of exports in 2005 are in the processing trade which tends to have a relatively low degree of risk 
exposure and small margins. 
25
 Other measures such as expanding the retail market forward foreign exchange settlement business to all 
foreign exchange designated banks and introducing swap transactions will not be discussed in this thesis.  
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Table 2.4: Monthly number of transactions
26
 in the inter-bank forward market 
Month Number of transactions 
August 2005 8 
September 2005 23 
October 2005 38 
November 2005 94 
December 2005 114 
Source: China Money, issue 7, 2005-issue 2, 2006 
 
Among the 277 market transactions in 2005, 263 belong to RMB/USD forwards trading while 
14 represent RMB/JPY trading. Term structures are quite diversified with 7 different terms 
for USD forwards and 4 for JPY forwards. The most liquid terms are 1 month and 12 month 
USD forwards. 
 
Lack of liquidity and limited scale are common for a nascent market and the onshore market 
has to face the competition from the RMB NDF market (see below for a discussion of the 
NDF market), a market offering products of similar functions and with a longer history. As a 
result, since its establishment, quotes in the onshore forward market follow that in the RMB 
NDF market closely.  
 
The underdeveloped money market in China may be the first to blame for the lack of 
independent pricing in the forward market. So far, China’s money market remains an 
inefficient market rather than a market where highly liquid products with a whole spectrum of 
maturities are traded. The determination of interest rates is still regulated by the central bank.   
As a result, no representative market interest rate indices in different maturities are formed
27
 
and the onshore forward has thus no interest rate to base the interest rate parity on. Second, as 
mentioned above, the RMB NDF market has 10 more years of history and a higher liquidity 
than the onshore market, so the forward rate formed in the NDF market has naturally 
constituted a reference system for the rate movements in the onshore forward market. 
Considering the self-fulfilling quality of market liquidity, the onshore market is already 
lagging behind. The absence of an independent and more rational pricing in the onshore 
market means that its risk hedging functions will be limited and that it will be in a 
disadvantageous position in its competition with the NDF market.   
                                                 
26
 Unfortunately, the trading volume information isn’t disclosed to the public and thus can’t be obtained. 
27
 The only ―market‖ interest rate in China is the 7 day repo rate.  
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2.3.3 Transform trading arrangements 
After the market making system and quote-driven dealer market system were introduced on 
January 4, 2006, China’s foreign exchange market became a quasi-centralized hybrid market 
featuring coexistence of a quote-driven dealer market and an order-driven auction market 
utilizing a electronic broking system. These two transformations in trading arrangements 
represent milestones in China’s foreign exchange market reform and will have far-reaching 
influences on the market structure, exchange rate formation mechanism as well as the central 
bank’s monetary policy.  
 
Diversified market liquidity provision mechanism 
Providing liquidity is the primary role of a market maker. Market makers regularly quote both 
bid and ask prices and stand ready to buy and sell at the quoted prices. They can absorb 
excess market supply or demand by holding inventory and make a profit through bid/ask 
spreads.  The role of market makers is thus crucial in achieving market clearing and providing 
liquidity. The market making system is especially important to nascent markets which often 
suffer from low liquidity or one-sided markets. With a mixed quote-driven dealer market and 
order-driven auction market structure, liquidity can be provided through multiple mechanisms 
and market participants are given more flexibility in choosing trading arrangements 
depending on the purposes of the transaction, the type of counterparty, the level of the 
transparency, the information they have and the size of the order (Harris, 2002). The biggest 
problem in China’s foreign exchange market structure is lack of liquidity. The transformation 
of trading arrangements, which brings a diversified market liquidity provision mechanism and 
increases the probability of deal making, is thus the most important move among all the 
reform measures to boost market liquidity.   
 
Price discovery and exchange rate formation mechanism 
Another important role of a market maker is price discovery. The introduction of market 
makers and quote-driven dealer markets in the spot market where the RMB against foreign 
currency pairs are traded plays a direct and central role in the determination of the RMB 
exchange rate. After the new trading arrangement was put into practice, the way of 
determination of the RMB central rate was changed from being determined by previous day’s 
closing rate formed in the inter-bank spot market to being determined by the weighted 
average of the prices quoted by 13 market makers consisting of both local banks and foreign 
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banks. However, it should be duly observed that the price discovery function of market 
makers in China’s foreign exchange market is still rather limited.  There still exists a narrow 
floating band prescribed by the central bank and regulators also regulate market makers’ net 
open foreign exchange positions
28
 (both gross aggregated positions and single currency 
positions) to limit their scope of price discovery. 
 
Central bank’s control of the foreign exchange market 
As already mentioned, before the market making system came into being, the central bank 
was the largest de facto ―market maker‖ in China’ s foreign exchange market. Under the 
strong RMB appreciation pressure, the central bank had to frequently and passively absorb 
excess supply of US dollar to clear the market and maintain the US peg. This leads to a 
variety of problems including lack of independency and flexibility in administering monetary 
policy. Assigning market making responsibilities to commercial banks gives the central bank 
a way out of this vicious circle and allows the central bank more freedom in tackling 
problems at home and experimenting with new open market operations such as currency 
swaps. With the transformation in the trading arrangements also comes the central bank’s 
adjustment in its way of controling the foreign exchange market. Market makers will 
inevitably take over at least part of the information processing and price discovery function. 
The Chinese authorities have clearly stated its standpoint in not yielding to political pressures 
by making any one-off exchange rate adjustment (Wen, 2006
29
). Thus continuing to breathe 
more latitude and more market forces into the exchange rate determination mechanism and as 
a result allowing more room for a gradual appreciation in the RMB/USD exchange rate is an 
expedient way of coping with political pressures from the international society.  
 
2.3.4 Capital account liberalization 
The current wave of loosening capital control has been prodded by the RMB appreciation 
pressure as well as the need to support domestic enterprises’ overseas development. Controls 
have been eased mainly on three fronts:  
 
First, allow domestic enterprises, financial institutions and individuals greater flexibility in 
retaining, acquiring and investing foreign exchange assets. For domestic resident individuals, 
controls on purchase of foreign exchange have been relaxed and a yearly quota equivalent to 
                                                 
28
 Market makers can’t hold short positions in US dollar.  
29
 This was clearly stated when Premier Wen addressed the press after the 4
th
 session of the 10
th
 National 
People’s Congress. 
  
23 
 
US$20,000 (up limit) in value will be adopted as of April 2006; for financial institutions, 
foreign exchange working positions have been enlarged in scope and in scale (September 
2005); for domestic enterprises, in that they have been allowed to retain foreign exchange 
earnings in their foreign exchange accounts for current account transactions up to a limit 
equivalent to the sum of 80% of the current account receipts and 50% of the current account 
payments recorded in the previous year (August 2005). 
 
Second, support domestic enterprises to invest and finance overseas. Rules to encourage 
domestic financial institutions’ provision of financing guarantees for domestic enterprises 
investing overseas came into effect in September 2005. Shortly afterwards in October 2005, 
domestic residents (including enterprises and individuals) were permitted to establish or 
control offshore special purpose vehicles (SPV)
30
 for equity financing and to return 
investment of proceeds. In April 2006, domestic residents’ foreign exchange investment 
channels were further broadened by the new regulation which enabled them to invest in 
financial products overseas through domestic commercial banks. The Qualified Domestic 
Institutional Investors (QDII) system is also around the corner which will give domestic 
banks, insurance companies, fund management companies and security companies a chance to 
invest in overseas capital markets. 
  
Third, encourage foreign capital’s participation in the domestic capital market. The Current 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)’ investment quota has been enlarged and 
restrictions on foreign institutions and enterprises’ financing activities in the domestic capital 
market have been gradually removed, granting them the right to issue RMB denominated 
bonds or become listed in the domestic capital market, possibly through the Chinese 
Depository Receipt
31
 (CDR).  
 
Capital account liberalization moves will help create the demand for foreign currencies and 
rebalance supply and demand in the foreign exchange market and in turn increase market 
activity. Cross-border capital outflows and inflows, facilitated by foreign and domestic 
enterprises/institutions’ ability to operate in both the domestic and overseas financial markets 
                                                 
30 The SPV is usually a subsidiary company with an asset/liability structure and legal status that makes its 
obligations secure even if the parent company goes bankrupt. SPV’s operations are limited to the acquisition and 
financing of specific assets 
31
 The Depository receipt is a negotiable financial instrument issued by a bank to represent a foreign company's 
publicly traded securities and can be traded on a local stock exchange. 
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as well as foreign banks’ strong presence in China’s foreign exchange market, can be 
expected to increase in frequency and volume. As a result, the domestic foreign exchange 
market will no longer be immune from new information and exchange rate movements born 
in overseas markets. On the other hand, recent policy initiatives have addressed some of the 
structural problems in the FX market and are expected to increase market liquidity, enhance 
market functions and influence exchange rate formation mechanisms. The rapid development 
of the domestic onshore foreign exchange market will make it more competitive in its race 
with the offshore market in terms of drawing liquidity and playing a leading role in price 
discovery. Thus mutual influences and further integration of the domestic foreign exchange 
market with international foreign exchange market should be anticipated.  
 
2.4 RMB NDF market: development and characteristics  
2.4.1 RMB NDF market 
Non-deliverable forwards or NDFs represent forward foreign exchange transactions where 
there is no actual delivery of the contracted currency (which is usually an emerging market 
currency with limited convertibility) on the settlement date. The only exchange that occurs on 
the value date is the difference in the US dollar value (or other convertible currency) between 
the NDF contracted forward rate set on the trade date and the prevailing spot reference rate or 
fixing rate. The NDF market is categorized as an offshore market since it trades outside the 
direct jurisdiction of the authorities of the corresponding currencies and their pricing need not 
be constrained by domestic interest rates. The NDF market offers an alternative hedging tool 
for foreign investors with local currency exposure or a speculative instrument for them to take 
positions offshore in the local currency. The market activity in many Asian NDF markets in 
part reflects absence of or restricted access to domestic forward markets. 
 
A Non-deliverable forward (NDF) market for the Chinese currency—RMB, inconvertible 
under capital account, emerged in Hong Kong and Singapore in 1995 and has become a 
highly liquid market since 2002 due to active speculation on the appreciation of the RMB. 
With an estimated average daily turnover of only $ 50 million in June 2001 (Lehman 
Brothers), the RMB NDF market has become a much deeper market over the years with a 
daily turnover reaching $ 200 million in early 2003 (Ma, 2004). However, the total volume of 
RMB NDF contracts only accounts for about 6% of the total NDF market volume
32
. Market 
                                                 
32
 See Emerging Market Trade Association 2003 NDF Market Volume Survey which can be found on EMTA’s 
website: www.emta.org. 
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liquidity has also improved with bid-ask spreads of 0.05-0.07 for a one-month contract and 
0.12-0.18 for a one-year contract, much smaller than other Asian NDFs
33
 and only larger than 
that for New Taiwan Dollar. The RMB NDF rate had been traded at premium
34
 with respect 
to its spot fixing rate during and after the Asian crisis reflecting the depreciation pressure on 
the Chinese currency but the trend was reversed after late 2002 towards discount, with 
increasing expectations of a strengthening of the RMB and of a regime change leading to 
revaluation. The volatility of the RMB NDF rate is higher than the spot rate and tends to be 
larger for longer maturities (see table 2.5). 
 
Table 2.5: Standard deviation of the RMB NDF and the spot daily closing rate, January 1, 
1999 to March 30, 2006 
Daily closing rate Standard Deviation 
1-month NDF 0.07 
3-month NDF 0.11 
6-month NDF 0.19 
12-month NDF 0.37 
Onshore Spot 0.06 
Source: Reuters. 
 
In earlier years, major participants in the RMB NDF market were multinationals who needed 
to hedge currency exposure associated with their foreign direct investment. But hedge funds 
have more recently assumed a more important role due to heightened speculation. It has been 
estimated that much of the volume in the RMB NDF is generated by speculative positioning 
while only a small proportion of customer demand for NDFs is currently based on FDI related 
hedging interests (Lipscomb, 2005). Besides, the NDF market has also served part of 
domestic enterprises’ foreign exchange investment needs35 due to lack of an onshore forward 
market until August 2005.  
 
                                                 
33
 Including Indian rupee, Indonesian rupiah, Korean won and Philippine peso.  
34
 Premium is the amount by which a forward rate exceeds a spot rate while discount is the amount by which a 
forward rate is below a spot rate. Here RMB/USD exchange rate is quoted by stating the number of units of 
RMB that can be bought in terms of 1 unit of USD (direct quotation), so a RMB NDF contract trading at 
premium reflects the market’s expectation of RMB depreciation in the future while a RMB NDF contract trading 
at discount reflects the expectation of RMB appreciation. 
35
 Even though illegal, there’re evidences that large domestic banks have been engaged in offering NDF products 
to their big corporate clients.  
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2.4.2 Differences and connections between the NDF market and the onshore foreign exchange 
market  
Trading the same underlying currency, the NDF market and onshore spot market seem to have 
a natural bond which is only strengthened by the settlement rules of NDF products.  
 
According to the terms of an NDF contract, if on the settlement date, the then-prevailing spot 
market exchange rate is greater (in foreign currency per dollar terms) than the previously 
agreed forward exchange rate, the holder of the contract who is long the emerging market 
currency must pay the holder of the other side of the contract the difference between the 
contracted forward price and the spot market rate. The settlement exchange rate is determined 
by a daily-posted rate (usually posted to a specific Reuters or Telerate screen), referred to as 
the ―fixing rate‖, which is generally based on the spot rate traded for the currency onshore. 
Thus the onshore spot rate is part of the formation of the final NDF settlement rate and will 
obviously exert influence over the NDF rate.  
 
Information flows and transmission of prices and volatility between two financial markets 
trading similar products are normal. In the absence of capital control, arbitrage between two 
markets will also lead to convergence in prices. But in the case of the RMB onshore market 
and offshore NDF market, there’re still many differences with respect to pricing and market 
functions. First, there’s capital control in place. Ma (2004) found a large difference between 
the onshore interest rate and the NDF market’s implied interest rate36, indicating existence of 
strict capital control. Second, the pricing mechanism of the RMB NDF market may cause the 
NDF rate changes to deviate from onshore rate changes. The pricing of most forward foreign 
exchange contracts is primarily based on the interest rate parity relationship which ties the 
premium (discount) to the interest rate gap between the two currencies. But NDF prices can 
also be affected by the perceived probability of changes in the foreign exchange regime, 
speculative positioning, conditions in local onshore interest rate markets and the relationship 
between the offshore and onshore currency forward markets. Lipscomb (2005) argued that the 
NDF prices for RMB are based primarily on the expected future level of the spot exchange 
rate rather than interest rate parity calculations since offshore participants have very limited 
access to onshore RMB interest rate products. Third, these two markets target different market 
                                                 
36
 This rate is calculated as: NDF = S (1+i)/(1+r
$
), where NDF refers to the NDF rate, S is the prevailing interest 
rate in the domestic money market (for China, Chibor is used); r
$
 is the US Dollar LIBOR and i is the NDF 
implied offshore yield. A large and persistent onshore/offshore spread (r – i) indicates the presence of effective 
cross-border restrictions. 
  
27 
 
participants. The NDF market is mainly participated by multinationals and hedge funds with 
little market entry barriers while the onshore market is still much more regulated and 
restricted in market entry with trade being dominated by state-owned banks. Thus, it’s 
reasonable to expect much less speculation and in turn volatility in the onshore spot market 
than in the NDF market.  
 
Generally speaking, the relationship between the onshore spot market and the NDF market 
will be enhanced after the new reforms in the foreign exchange market and the liberalization 
of the capital account, even though existence of capital control and limited participation by 
offshore players in the domestic money market can still effectively diminish across-market 
arbitrage activities and hinder the rapid integration of the two markets. Lipscomb (2005) 
observed that in countries where regulations permit greater access for local entities to the 
offshore NDF markets, and offshore entities greater access to onshore markets, NDF prices 
will affect and be affected by local market prices, while for countries where cross-border 
market access is more limited, NDF prices will reflect primarily offshore supply and demand 
factors and have limited ability to influence onshore market. This coincides with evidence 
from Korea prior to the 1997 reform offered by Park (2001) which shows that the onshore 
market seems to lead the offshore market in this period.  
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3. Mean and Volatility spillover effects between 
RMB NDF and onshore spot market 
3.1  Methodology 
In this part of the empirical study of mean and volatility spillover effects between the RMB 
NDF market and onshore spot market, methods used will include an ADF unit root test testing 
for non-stationarity and a bivariate test of stationarity of the times series in the dataset, the 
Johansen co-integration test, the Johansen test of weak exogeneity and Granger causality test 
as well as ARCH and GARCH models to capture heteroscedasticity and investigate inter-
market mean and volatility spillover effects. In this section, we’ll briefly review the concept 
of co-integration and the ARCH/GARCH family of statistical models.  
 
3.1.1 Co-integration 
The concept of co-integration, formally introduced by the work of Granger (1983) and Engle 
and Granger (1987), is very important since it describes the existence of an equilibrium or 
stationary relationship among two or more time-series, each of which is individually non-
stationary. Consider a vector time series of dimension n, 1 2( , ,..., )t t t ntx x xx  where tx  is I(1), 
i.e. non-stationary with a unit root so that tx  is I (0), i.e. stationary. If there exist a vector i  
such that, (0), 1,2,...,t i tw x I i r  then the relevant components of tx  are said to be co-
integrated (see Banerjee et al., 1993).  
 
The methodology proposed by Johansen (1988) tests the number of co-integrating 
relationships in systems of equations and can be adapted to indicate the direction of causality. 
This method is based on a p-dimensional VAR of order k for all variables in a given 
information set. An important property characterizing co-integrated variables is that they are 
known to have, among other representations, an error-correction representation (Granger’s 
Representation Theorem). Let the error-correction representation be expressed as: 
 
(3.1) 
1
1
1
t t i t i t t
k
i
y y y D , (0, )t IID  
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where t=1,…,T, ty is the n 1 vector consisting of the model endogenous I (1) variables, tD  
contains deterministic components as centered seasonal dummies and I (0) variables 
conditional upon in the analysis.  is a vector of constants. The rank of the coefficient matrix 
π for the lagged level variables 1ty  yields the number of co-integrating relationships. There 
are three distinct cases regarding the rank of π, (i) r n , (ii) 0r , and (iii) 0 r n . If (i) or 
full rank of π applies, then all the variables in ty are stationary; if (ii) is true, then there’s no 
co-integration between the variables in ty  and all variables become non-stationary; if (iii) is 
the case, then we have a co-integrated system with r co-integrating vectors. In this case, π can 
be expressed as the product of a n r loading matrix α and r n co-integrating vector matrix β′ 
where the rows in β′ are the co-integrating vectors and the columns in α the adjustment 
coefficients or feedback coefficients which measure the degree of error correction in the 
individual equations of the system.  
 
3.1.2 ARCH and GARCH models 
It’s a stylized fact that foreign exchange rates and rate changes (first differences) are 
characterized by ―volatility clustering‖ (Melvin, 2003). This has led to the application of 
ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) and GARCH (Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) models in describing the volatility of financial 
time series.  
 
―Volatility clustering‖ is a phenomenon that large price changes tend to be followed by large 
changes and small changes tend to be followed by small changes (Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 
1965), indicating that the error term of an autoregressive process with a constant 
unconditional variance could have a time varying conditional variance. An autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) model to capture the effect of this changing volatility 
introduced by Engle (1982) takes the following form: 
 
(3.2.1) 
t t ty c x u , 
1/ 2 , ~ (0,1)t t t tu h v v IID  
(3.2.2) 
2 2
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1
( ...)
q
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i
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where th  is the conditional variance, tx  is a vector containing lags of the dependent variable, 
exogenous variables conditioned upon in the analysis or the conditional variance term th , 
>0, 0i , and 
1
1
q
i
i
(i=1,…q). 
 
A white noise process tu  satisfying (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) is described as an ARCH process of 
order q, denoted ( )tu ARCH q .  
 
If tx  contains the conditional variance term th  then we will arrive at an ARCH-in-mean 
model introduced by Engle, Lilien and Robin (1987) to capture the effect that higher 
perceived variability in tu  has on the level of ty
37
. 
 
The ARCH model which didn’t allow the conditional variance at time t to have a stochastic 
component was extended by Bollerslev (1986) to become a generalized conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model. The GARCH model can be formulated as follows, 
 
(3.3.1) 
t t ty c x u , 
1/ 2 , ~ (0,1)t t t tu h v v IID  
(3.3.2) 
2
1 1
q p
t i t i i t i
i i
h u h  
 
where th  is the conditional variance, tx  is a vector containing lags of the dependent variable, 
exogenous variables conditioned upon in the analysis or the conditional variance term th ,  
>0, 0i (i=1,…q), and 0i  (i=1,…p) and 
1 1
1
q p
i i
i i
. 
 
The GARCH model can then encompass all ARCH versions as an ARCH (q) model can be 
specified as a GARCH (0,q) model. Let the tx  be a vector containing lags of the dependent 
variable and rewrite (3.2.1) below: 
 
                                                 
37
 As suggested in Finance theory, an asset with higher perceived risk would pay a higher average return 
(Hamilton, 1994).  
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(3.4) 
1
m
t i t i t
i
y c y u , 
1/ 2 , ~ (0,1)t t t tu h v v IID  
 
(3.4) together with (3.3.2) constitute an AR (m)-GARCH (p, q) used later in the thesis. 
 
A situation where 
1 1
1
q p
i i
i i
 is referred to as an integrated GARCH process, or 
IGARCH. An error term tu  following an IGARCH process has infinite unconditional 
variance, or in other words, the volatility of a series is permanently affected by any shocks 
(Engle and Bollerslev, 1986). Then neither tu  nor 
2
tu  satisfies the definition of covariance-
stationary, however, there’s still a possibility that tu  comes from a strictly stationary process 
(see Nelson, 1991).  
 
Finally, a GARCH_t model which will be utilized in the later sections of the thesis means a 
GARCH with student t-distributed rather than normally distributed errors. Estimation of the 
ARCH/GARCH models is usually realized by maximizing the likelihood function using 
numerical techniques based on the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) algorithm.  
Under the ARCH/GARCH framework, the mean and volatility effects from market i to 
market j can be easily tested by including the mean and conditional variance from market i as 
exogenous variables in market j’s mean and conditional variance equations respectively and 
exploring the significance level of relevant coefficients.  
 
3.2  Data, integration and descriptive statistics 
3.2.1 Data and preliminary graphs 
The data employed in this thesis consist of daily RMB-US Dollar closing rates of the one-
month NDF in the RMB NDF market and RMB spot in the onshore spot market. Both the 
spot rate and NDF rate data are obtained from REUTERS.  
 
The data period starts January 1, 1999 and ends March 30, 2006. Since there was a regime 
change in July 21, 2005 when China abandoned the de facto US Dollar peg and opted for a 
reference to a basket peg, we could go a step further to divide the whole dataset into two 
periods: the pre-reform period covering the time span from January 1, 1999 to July 20, 2005 
and the post-reform period covering the time span from July 21, 2005 to March 30, 2006. By 
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this division, we’ll be able to look at the impact of the reform on the exchange rate behavior 
and the two markets dynamics. Both the pre-reform and post-reform periods will be studied in 
the preliminary analysis but only the post-reform period will be the focus of research in 
subsequent analyses.  
 
Figure 3.1: Level NDF and Spot closing rates, pre-reform period, Jan.1, 1999-Jul.20, 2005 
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Source: Reuters. 
 
Figure 3.2: Level NDF and Spot closing rates, post-reform period, Jul.21, 2005-Mar.30, 2006 
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Source: Reuters. 
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From figure 3.1, it can be seen that the RMB spot exchange rate curve is almost flat before the 
July 21 reform, which is not surprising since in that period, China’s exchange rate was pegged 
to US Dollar and the floating band was further narrowed after the Asian Financial Crisis. The 
central bank had to frequently intervene in the onshore foreign exchange market to maintain 
the peg which resulted in a ―super stable‖ RMB-US Dollar rate over the pre-reform period. 
Considering the virtually fixed spot rate, the pre-reform structural and institutional features of 
China’s onshore foreign exchange market discussed above and the existence of capital 
control, it’s reasonable to expect little information flows between the onshore spot market and 
the offshore NDF market in this period. Thus we will conduct ADF unit root tests and review 
the basic statistics describing exchange rate movements for both periods below and preclude 
the pre-reform period from our analyses thereafter.  
 
3.2.2 ADF unit root test  
Prior to time-series modeling, it is necessary to determine the orders of integration for the 
variables in the dataset. Below we therefore first present the results from using augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests with a constant to test for unit roots in individual time series (Dickey and 
Fuller, 1981).  
 
The ADF test is a common approach for testing non-stationarity in time series. When ty  
follows the AR (p) process in 3.5, the ADF unit root test can be constructed with the 
regression model in 3.6.  
 
(3.5)  
1
p
t i t i t
i
y y  
(3.6)  
1
1
1
p
t t i t i t
i
y y y u  
 
If the null hypothesis that =1 is true, then ty  is a random walk and if the null hypothesis is 
false, then ty  is stationary. The results from a test based on a t-statistic of the form 
ˆ( 1) / ˆ( )SE  are reported in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: ADF (4) Statistics for Testing for a Unit Root 
Variable Critical Values Null Hypothesis 
  I (1) I (2) 
Pre-reform period (Sample size: 1709) 
NDF 
5%=-2.86 
1%=-3.44 
-2.44 -22.20** 
Spot 
5%=-2.86 
1%=-3.44 
  -4.95** -20.44** 
    
Post-reform period (Sample size: 181) 
NDF 
5%=-2.88 
1%=-3.47 
-0.74 -8.35** 
Spot 
5%=-2.88 
1%=-3.47 
0.19 -7.25** 
           Notes:   
1. For a null hypothesis of I (1), the ADF (4) statistic is testing a null hypothesis of a unit root in the levels 
of the variable ty against the alternative of a stationary root. For a null hypothesis of I (2), the ADF (4) 
statistic is testing a null hypothesis of a unit root in the first differences of the variable ty against the 
alternative of a stationary root. 
2. A constant term is included the corresponding regressions. 
3. Here and elsewhere in the thesis, asterisk * and ** denote the rejection of the null hypotheses at the 5% 
and 1% significance level respectively.   
 
From table 3.1, it can be seen that the null of a non-stationary NDF rate can’t be rejected to a 
level below 5% in neither the pre-reform or post-reform period while that for Spot can be 
rejected in the pre-reform period but not in the post-reform period, indicating that the spot rate 
becomes non-stationary after the July 21 reform. These findings echoes what we can see from 
figure 3.1 and 3.2 and reflects the fact that more flexibility and in turn more volatility in the 
spot rate behavior, were introduced after the reform in the RMB exchange rate regime. 
 
The non-stationarity found in both periods, however, disappears after the first differences are 
taken, as can be seen from table 3.1 and the fact that NDF  and Spot  are stationary in both 
periods. According to the ADF unit root tests, both NDF and Spot variables appear to be 
integrated of order one in the post reform period. As a result, 1t tNDF NDF NDF  and 
1tSpot Spot Spot  will be used for most of the following analyses except the co-
integration test.  
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The above ADF test is a univariate test for stationarity in time series. Later in the thesis 
another test for stationarity using the Johansen method in a multivariate framework will also 
be presented together with a discussion of the differences between the two tests for 
stationarity and a comparison of the results. 
 
3.2.3 Summary statistics  
Table 3.2 below reports the descriptive statistics for the first differences of the NDF and Spot 
rate in both the pre-reform and post-reform period.  
 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics for spot and NDF rate changes 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Excess 
kurtosis 
Normality 
test 2 (2)  
L-B  
Q (10) 
L-B  
Q
2 
(10)  
Pre-reform period  
NDF -4.4614e-005 0.0048 -0.315 16.008 2983.0 
(0.00) 
110.89 
(0.00) 
303.95 
(0.00) 
Spot -1.4052e-006 0.0002 0.298 4.797 620.52 
(0.00) 
70.08 
(0.00) 
354.20 
(0.00) 
Post-reform period  
 
NDF -0.0002 0.0066 0.5578 4.5602 65.188  
(0.00) 
16.75 
(0.08) 
2.63 
(0.99) 
Spot -0.0005 0.0025 -0.6229 1.6569 14.492  
(0.00) 
18.53 
(0.04) 
40.56 
(0.00) 
Note: P-values are in parentheses. 
 
From table 3.2, negative means are observed for changes in NDF and spot rates across the 
whole sample period from 1999 to 2006, indicating the appreciation pressure on the Chinese 
currency. Average exchange rate changes are larger in the post-reform period than in the pre-
reform period. Standard deviations for both NDF and Spot have larger values in the post-
reform period than in the pre-reform period, exhibiting an increase in volatility after the 
reform. In particular, the magnitude of increase in Spot  (0.0023) is larger than that in NDF  
(0.0018), reflecting the central bank’s stronger control over the spot exchange rate under the 
previously ―fixed‖ exchange rate regime and the effect that the regime change had on central 
bank’s way of control and market participants’ behavior. In general, the volatility in the 
offshore market is higher than in the onshore spot market, which is quite evident considering 
the strong presence of speculative activities in the offshore market. Distribution properties of 
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the NDF and spot rate are also examined in table 3.2 with a null hypothesis that both series 
have a normal distribution. A normal distribution would have Skewness around zero and 
Kurtosis of three (Skewness and Kurtosis are defined in (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) in Appendix 2). 
Thus both series are skewed and leptokurtic in both periods. The null hypothesis of a normal 
distribution is rejected by the normality test based on Doornik and Hansen (1994). The null 
hypothesis for the Ljung-Box statistic is that all serial correlation of NDF ( Spot ) up to lag 
10 are jointly zero. The 0H  is clearly rejected for both NDF and Spot in both periods in 
figure 3.2, showing strong autocorrelation in both series. The Ljung-Box Q
2 
(10) statistic for 
Spot  is also strongly significant, indicating the presence of serial correlation in squared 
series of Spot  suggesting the existence of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in 
the noise process.  
 
3.3 Co-integration and causality 
Co-integration in system of equations has been reviewed in the methodology section of this 
thesis and here Johansen co-integration tests will be applied to our dataset in order to identify 
the long-run relationships and the direction of causality between NDF and spot rates in the 
post-reform period. A bivariate test for stationarity and the Granger causality test will also be 
included.  
 
3.3.1 Johansen co-integration test 
Since the co-integration method in the thesis is based on a vector autoregression of order k for 
both variables in the dataset and this order is not known a priori, preliminary testing of the lag 
order is appropriate. Starting with a VAR of order five, both the individual equation and 
system diagnostics are reported as in table 3.3 and 3.4.  
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Table 3.3: Single equation diagnostics for the unrestricted VAR 
Equation AR 1-2 test 
F(2,163) 
ARCH 1-1 test 
F(1,163) 
Hetero test 
F(20,144) 
Hetero-X test 
F(65,99) 
Normality test 
2 (2)  
NDF 1.1118 
[0.3314] 
0.0180 
[0.8935] 
0.5325 
[0.9487] 
0.5055 
[0.9981] 
6.4977 
[0.0388]* 
Spot 0.5797 
[0.5612] 
2.5003 
[0.1158] 
1.52 
[0.0828] 
1.175 
[0.2322] 
15.996 
[0.0003]** 
Notes:   
1. The significance probability for F statistic and 
2
 test is reported in square brackets. 
2. Doornik and Hendry (2001) argue that it is usually unwise to the force the constant to lie in the co-
integration space. A test has been conducted to decide whether the constant should be restricted or left 
unrestricted when estimating the unrestricted reduced form system in this thesis. We constructed an error 
correction model where the co-integrating relation included a restrictedly estimated constant. Then the 
constant term of the error correction model was set equal to zero. The rejection of this zero restriction to a 
level of close to one percent indicates that when specifying the VAR the constant should not be restricted to 
lie in the co-integration space. 
 
Table 3.4: Vector test diagnostics for the unrestricted VAR 
AR 1-2 test 
F(8,320) 
Hetero test 
F(60,424) 
Hetero-X test 
F(195,291) 
Normality test 
2 (4)  
Skewness 
 
Excess 
Kurtosis 
1.1908 
[0.3038] 
1.0330 
[0.4147] 
0.8221 
[0.9300] 
27.889 
[0.0000]** 
-0.4725 
-0.5106 
4.3206 
4.8006 
Notes:   
1.  The significance probability for F statistic and 
2
 test is reported in square brackets. 
 
All statistics are fine in table 3.3 and 3.4 except those for normality. The null hypotheses of 
normality were rejected for both the single equation and system diagnostics. A closer look at 
the last two columns in table 3.4 suggests, however, that the normality anomaly may be due to 
large values of excess kurtosis and thus should not seriously contribute to jeopardize the 
results of the co-integration analysis (see Gonzalo 1994). 
 
In order to determine the appropriate order of the VAR for the co-integration analysis, a 
general to specific approach is adopted starting with a VAR of order five. Now we can seek 
sequential reduction in the system by deleting the fifth lags of both the NDF and Spot rate, re-
estimating the system and checking the information criteria and F-form statistic for the 
validity of the reduction. If the reduction is valid then a further deletion of the fourth lags will 
be carried out and so forth. It can be shown in table A.1.1 (see Appendix 1) that it is 
statistically acceptable to simplify the VAR to an order of two. SC and AIC criteria continue 
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to improve with null hypothesis not rejected from VAR (5) all the way down to VAR (2) but 
not further to a VAR of order 1, suggesting the appropriate VAR order to be equal to two.  
 
With the order determined, the Johansen co-integration test can be performed with the results 
implying the number of co-integrating vectors reported in table 3.5 below. 
 
Table 3.5 Johansen Co-integration Test 
System:
t
t
t
NDF
Y
Spot
    
Model:
1 1 111 12 11 12
1 1 221 22 21 22
t t t t
t t t t
NDF NDF NDF ed d
Spot Spot Spot ed d
, π=
11 12
21 22
=αβ′ 
VAR order: 2, unrestricted constant.        
Sample period: July 21, 2005 to March 30, 2006 (post-reform period).  
Eigenvalues: λ1=0.0897  λ2= 9.6768e-005 
Trace eigenvalue test  
0H  1H  Test values 
r=0 r=2 16.847 [0.029] * 
r=1 r=2 0.017 [0.895] 
Notes:   
1. r denotes the rank of the π matrix.  
2. p-value is reported in square brackets. 
3. Trace test is likelihood test defined by
1
ˆ2 ln ln(1 )
p
i
i t
Q T .  
 
The null hypothesis of rank r is tested against the alternative hypothesis of full rank. From 
Table 3.5, it can be seen that the null of a rank equal to zero is rejected to a significance level 
below 5% while the null of a rank equal to one can’t be rejected. Thus we’ll be able to 
identify one co-integrating relationship between the two I (1) series, NDF and Spot, 
supporting the existence of a long-run equilibrium relation between the RMB-US Dollar NDF 
and onshore spot rates. The eigenvector and adjustment coefficient vector are presented below 
in 3.7 and 3.8.  
 
(3.7)  Normalized eigenvectors β′= (1.0000, -1.2558) 
(3.8)  Adjustment coefficient (feedback coefficients) α =
-0.1656
0.0259
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The adjustment coefficient vector α is significantly estimated and correctly signed in the sense 
that if the NDF and SPOT rates are higher than those implied by the co-integrating 
relationship and thus produce an error, this error will contribute to a lowering of the NDF and 
SPOT rate respectively. 
 
The linear combination (by restricting the co-integrating rank to one but with no additional 
restrictions) as well as the LR test for a homogeneity restriction on the co-integrating vector is 
displayed in table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6: Co-integrating linear combination and tests of (1, 1) restriction 
The unrestricted co-integrating linear combination: 
t
t
NDF
Spot
= 
(0.090)
NDF-  Spot1.2558  
Hypothesis: LR-test, Rank=1 
1 2  5.7496 [0.0165]* 
Notes:   
The value shown in the parenthesis below the coefficient of the co-integrating vector is the standard error of 
the coefficient.  
 
The rank one LR-test result clearly rejected the hypothesis of 1 2  or a homogeneity 
restriction on the co-integrating vector, precluding the possibility of a co-integrating linear 
combination of the form: 
t
t
NDF
Spot
= NDF- Spot .  
Restrictions on the co-integrating vector also enable us to carry out multivariate tests for 
stationarity.  
 
3.3.2 Multivariate test for stationarity 
Multivariate tests for stationarity and the univariate ADF test discussed above differ in two 
important ways. First, when using the multivariate test for stationarity under the Johansen 
framework, the null hypothesis is that the individual time series is stationary while when 
using the ADF test, the null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root and thus non-
stationarity. Second, the multivariate test statistics may have higher finite sample power than 
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the univariate test and are believed to yield more reliable results (see De Brouwer and 
Ericsson, 1995). 
 
By testing the restriction that the co-integrating vector contains all zeros except for a unity 
corresponding to the designated variable, we’ll be able to test the stationarity of the individual 
time series. A co-integrating relationship has been identified between the two I(1) variables 
NDF and Spot, a certain linear combination of them results therefore in a stationary process. 
Thus restricting the co-integrating vector to take the form of (1,0) leads to the null hypothesis 
of a stationary NDF series while a co-integrating vector equal to (0,1)  would imply a null of 
a stationary Spot series. The 2 (1)  statistics in table 3.7 show that both of these null 
hypotheses are rejected, which points to the non-stationarity of both series. This result is 
consistent with our findings in the ADF test. 
 
Table 3.7: Multivariate statistics for testing stationarity 
Variable NDF Spot 
Test conditional on one co-integrating vector 
2 (1)  15.820 
[0.0001]** 
16.785 
[0.0000]** 
Notes:   
P-value is shown in square brackets.  
 
3.3.3 Causality  
After a long-run equilibrium relationship has been found, it will also be interesting to look at  
the implied causality of the co-integration analysis as the presence of error correction contains 
important clues to the direction of information flow between the offshore NDF market and the 
onshore spot market. To help with this a simple test of weak exogeneity proposed by 
Johansen (1992a, 1992b) will be employed first followed by a Granger causality test
38
.  
 
Johansen’s test of weak exogeneity 
This test consists of a test of zero restrictions on a subset of the adjustment coefficients in the 
loading matrix α (the error correction coefficients). Let’s consider an error correction version 
of the system under analysis as follow, 
                                                 
38
 Johansen’s test of weak exogeneity tests whether there’s any feedback from the error correction term to the 
variable under analysis, the Granger causality test, on the other hand, is a joint test of both the feedback effects 
through error correction and the dynamic short run lagged effects through the model endogenous variables. Thus 
the Johansen causality test is encompassed by the Granger causality test in this sense.  
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(3.9)  1 1 1 1( 1.2558 )t t t t tY D Y NDF Spot e  
 
where tY =
t
t
NDF
Spot
, 1tY =
1
1
t
t
NDF
Spot
, 1 11.2558 t tNDF Spot is the error correction term 
corresponding to 
1
1 2
1
( , )
t
t
NDF
Spot
, 
-0.1656
0.0259
 and te =
1
2
t
t
e
e
. 
 
As a result, in the dataset under analysis, a null hypothesis of α1 =0 means that the NDF rate 
does not error correct deviations from its long run relationship with the Spot rate or 
equivalently that the NDF rate is exogenous with respect to estimation of the long-run 
parameters; on the other hand, a null hypothesis of α2 =0 means that it’s the Spot rate that 
does not error correct and thus can be considered exogenous. Table 3.8 shows that the weak 
exogeneity of the NDF rate is rejected which suggests an error correction causality going 
from the onshore spot rate to the NDF rate. The weak exogeneity of the Spot rate on the other 
hand can’t be rejected to a level below 5% which rules out an error correction causality going 
from the NDF rate to the spot rate.  
 
Table 3.8: Tests of weak exogeneity  
Hypothesis: LR-test, Rank=1 
1 0    9.4920 [0.0021]** 
2 0  1.3234 [0.2500] 
Notes:   
LR test’s p-value is shown in square brackets.  
 
 
Granger causality test 
If, in the universe of information, deleting the history of one set of variables does not alter the 
joint distribution of any of the remaining variables, then the omitted variables were defined by 
Granger (1969) not to cause the remaining variables (Hendry and Mizon, 1999). A bivariate 
VAR system can be used to explain the concept of Granger causality (Hamilton, 1994): 
 
In a bivariate VAR describing x and y, y doesn’t Granger-cause x if the coefficient matrices 
Φj are lower triangular for all j: 
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(3.10)
(1) (2) ( )
1 2 11 11 11 11
(1) (1) (2) (2) ( ) ( )
1 2 22 21 22 21 22 21 22
0 0 0
...
p
t pt t t t
p p
t pt t t t
xx x xc
yy y yc
 
Note: See Hamilton, James D. (1994): Time Series Analysis, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press: 
303 
 
An error correction model of the system can be constructed as in (3.10) and estimated 
unrestrictedly in order to perform the Granger causality test for the dataset under analysis. 
As can be seen in table 3.9, the tests for non-Granger-causality in the marginal processes of 
respectively NDF and Spot are both rejected. This yields evidence of a two-way causality. 
This result isn’t in full accordance with the unidirectional causality found in Johansen’s test of 
weak exogeneity but it’s worth noting that the Granger causality test encompasses the 
Johansen causality test in the sense that in addition to test for the significance of error 
correction it tests for dynamic feedback effects through the lagged model endogenous 
variables.  
 
Table 3.9: Granger causality test 
Null Hypothesis F-statistic P-value 
①Spot doesn’t Granger cause NDF 4.7777 ** 0.0095 
②NDF doesn’t Granger cause Spot 3.4980 * 0.0324 
Notes:   
Since a VAR of order two is used in our previous analysis, the Granger causality test is performed with two 
regressions. For test of the null hypothesis①, we regress tNDF on 1tNDF , 1tSpot  and the co-integration 
relationship lagged one period and conduct a F-test on the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
1t
Spot  and 
the co-integration relationship lagged one period are jointly zero. For test of the null hypothesis ②, we 
regress
t
Spot on
1t
Spot , 1tNDF and the co-integration relationship lagged one period and conduct a F-
test on the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 1tNDF  and the co-integration relationship lagged one 
period are jointly zero.  
 
There exist many critiques of the Granger causality test and it might therefore be dangerous to 
infer the direction of true causation from this test alone. Nevertheless, this test remains useful 
in the sense that the result is simply reflecting the presence or absence of feedbacks in a 
limited dataset, irrespective of whether or not they are ―genuine DGP causes‖ (Hendry and 
Mizon, 1999). This ―presence or absence of feedbacks in a limited dataset‖ is exactly what 
we’re interested in, so it’s quite safe to say there’re presences of feedbacks or information 
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flows in both directions between the offshore NDF market and the onshore spot market in the 
post-reform period based on the Granger causality test. Direction of spillover effects between 
the two markets will be further explored in the GARCH modeling section of this thesis and a 
rationale behind these findings are provided. 
 
3.4 Spillover effects between NDF and spot markets 
As mentioned in the introduction, the use of the ARCH/GARCH framework to describe 
exchange rate behavior and explore the mean and volatility contagion effects across different 
foreign exchange markets is pervasive in the literature. The ARCH/GARCH approach will 
also be adopted in this thesis to capture the conditional heteroscedasticity in the data sample
39
 
and test for potential spillover effects between the RMB NDF market and onshore spot market 
in the post-reform period. Model specification tests of a variety of models under the 
ARCH/GARCH framework have been tested on the dataset and the AR (1)-GARCH (1,1) and 
AR (1)-GARCH_t (1, 1) have been confirmed as the most parsimonious fit to 
the tNDF and tSpot series.  
 
The AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) model for NDF rate changes-- tNDF  can be formulated by a set 
of mean and conditional variance equations as in (3.11.1) and (3.11.2): 
 
(3.11.1)  1  i itt tNDF c NDF u , 
1/ 2 , ~ (0,1)it it it itu h v v IID  
(3.11.2) 2
0 1 1 1it iti i it ith u h  
 
The AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) with student t-distributed error model for Spot rate changes--
t
Spot can be formulated as follows, 
 
(3.12.1) 1it ittSpot c Spot u , 
1/2
1, ~ [ ]it it it it tu h F t  
(3.12.2) 20 1 1 1it iti i it ith u h  
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 The preliminary analysis of our dataset reported in section 3.3 has offered some clue of the presence of 
conditional heteroscedasticity as strong autocorrelation in the squares of the differenced series Spot  is found.  
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Estimation results of model (3.11.1)-(3.11.2) and (3.12.1)-(3.12.2) are shown in table 3.10 
below, indicating no major misspecification. For model (3.12.1)-(3.12.2), the coefficients for 
the GARCH (1, 1) terms, 1i and it , the student t-distributed error term and the AR (1) term 
are all statistically significant while for model  (3.11.1)-(3.11.2), the insignificant GARCH (1, 
1) coefficients may be due to the fact that most part of the heteroscedasticity in the series has 
been seized by the AR (1) term reflected in the strongly significant coefficient of that term.  
 
With these results at hand, further steps can be taken to model the mean and volatility 
spillover effects. Contemporaneous mean spillover effects from the spot market to the NDF 
market can be represented by adding tSpot to equation (3.11.1) and volatility spillover 
effects can be modeled by including the squares residuals estimated from the AR (1)-
GARCH_t (1, 1) model in equation (3.11.2). Similar operations will be able to examine 
contemporaneous mean and volatility spillover effects from the NDF market to the spot 
market. Equations (3.13.1)-(3.13.2) to (3.14.1)-(3.14.2) given below will articulate the 
methods.  
 
Table 3.10: Estimates of AR (1)-GARCH (1, 1) and AR (1)-GARCH_t (1, 1) model 
 
tNDF  tSpot  
 Coefficient t-stat.  
(p-value in the 
brackets) 
Coefficient t-stat.  
(p-value in 
the brackets) 
c  -0.0006 -1.33 (0.186) -0.0004 -2.61 (0.010) 
i  -0.173 -2.50 (0.013) -0.162 -2.03 (0.044) 
0i  2.04881e-005 0.91 (0.363) 8.82698e-008 0.92 (0.361) 
1i  0.111   1.29 (0.199) 0.079 2.27 (0.024) 
it  0.307 0.469 (0.640) 0.918 33.3 (0.000) 
Student-t df   5.64 2.78 (0.006) 
Number of obs. 179 179 
Log-likelihood 664.752 837.25 
Normality test 
2 (2)  6.0171 (0.05) 9.501 (0.0086)** 
Portmanteau(10) 11.990 (0.2139) 19.934 (0.0183)* 
Portmanteau
2
(10) 4.677 (0.7915)   7.390 (0.4952) 
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Note: 
For
t
Spot , 1i it 0.9966, which indicates an IGARCH model and thus a close to unit root in the variance 
process. Engle, ITO and Lin pointed out that this was indicative of shocks lasting forever but as argued by 
Nelson (1991), GARCH models including IGARCH models are in general strictly stationary. Thus modeling the 
spot rate changes by an IGARCH should neither pose a stability problem nor a balanced equation problem.  
 
Spillover effects from the spot market to the NDF market: 
(3.13.1) 1  i j ti itt tNDF c NDF uSpot , 
1/ 2 , ~ (0,1)it it it itu h v v IID  
(3.13.2) 2 2
0 1 1 1
ˆ + it i j jt i it it ith u h  
 
Spillover effects from the NDF market to the spot market: 
(3.14.1) 1jt j jttitSpot c Spot uNDF , 
1/2
1, ~ [ ]jt jt jt jt tu h F t  
(3.14.2) 2 2
0 1 1 1
ˆjt i it jtj j jt jth u h  
 
where 2ˆ
jt
 is the squared residuals estimated from the AR (1)-GARCH_t (1, 1) model for 
tSpot  and 
2ˆit is the squared residuals estimated from the AR(1) -GARCH (1, 1) model 
for tNDF . A subscript of i represents the NDF market and j symbolizes the spot market. 
Thus a significant coefficient j indicates mean spillover and j volatility spillover from the 
spot market to the NDF market while the significance of i  and i  will be evidence of mean 
and volatility spillover from the NDF market to the spot market. Test results are derived in 
table 3.11.1 and 3.11.2.  
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Table 3.11.1: Mean and volatility spillover effects from the spot market to the NDF market 
 Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
ic  -0.0001 -0.381 0.704 
i  -0.258 -3.36 0.001 
j  0.928 3.66 0.000 
j  -0.203 -0.88 0.380 
0i  1.72663e-005 2.18 0.031 
1i  0.259 1.25 0.214 
it  0.213 0.64 0.522 
 
Table 3.11.2: Mean and volatility spillover effects from the NDF market to the spot market 
 Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
jc  -0.0003 -2.54   0.012 
j  -0.104 -1.22 0.225 
i  0.124 3.57 0.000 
i  0.058 1.80 0.074 
0j
 2.04720e-006 2.66 0.009 
1j
 0.226 1.64 0.102 
jt  0.098 0.69 0.489 
Student-t df 6.480 2.25 0.026 
 
Both j and i  are strongly significant as shown in table 3.11.1 which suggests strong mean 
spillover effects from the spot to the NDF market and from the NDF market to the spot 
market in the post-reform period. Neither j nor i  is found significant to a level below 5% in 
table 3.11.2 which points to lack of obvious volatility spillover between the two markets in 
the post-reform period, though a positive i  is found significant to a level below 8%, 
suggesting some weak volatility spillovers from the NDF to the spot market. This finding of 
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two-way mean spillover effects is consistent with the Granger test results and can be justified 
by several observations covered in chapter 2. 
First, the July 21 reform broke the super-stability of the onshore spot rate and allowed more 
freedom in rate movements, thus the onshore spot rate changes have shown a stronger 
correlation with the offshore rate changes.  
 
Second, after the effort to transform trading arrangements, market makers now have a larger 
role in the determination of the exchange rate. Central bank’s intervention has become less 
frequent and its way of control in the foreign exchange market has also been changed. Supply 
and demand factors including offshore supply and demand will then exert more influence on 
the less manipulated or distorted spot rate onshore, which corroborates our empirical result of 
a mean spillover effect from the NDF to the spot rate.  
 
Third, as discussed in chapter 2, the onshore spot rate enters the calculation of the NDF 
settlement rate and there’s evidence that the RMB NDF market is highly speculative with its 
pricing primarily based on the expectation of future spot rate level in the onshore market 
rather than the interest rate parity. The NDF rate is in turn highly sensitive to the rate changes 
and policy moves in the onshore spot market and in this sense, the spot rate will lead the NDF 
rate. 
 
Fourth, reform in the foreign exchange market has broadened market access in the onshore 
spot market. On the other hand, capital control is no longer biased towards capital outflow but 
supporting domestic enterprises, institutions and individuals’ direct investment and financing 
or investing activities in offshore or overseas financial markets. These trends of greater access 
for local players to the offshore NDF markets and offshore players greater access to onshore 
markets have already resulted in a two-way mean spillover effects between the two markets in 
the post-reform period. The spillover effect will become stronger with these new reform 
measures coming into full effect, however, since the post-reform sample data used in this 
thesis only cover the market performance in a short period (8 months) immediately after the 
reform, this cross-border market access effect is rather limited, which is reason why the mean 
spillover from the spot market to the NDF market is much stronger (a coefficient of 0.928) 
than from the NDF market to the onshore spot market (a coefficient of 0.124).  As discussed 
in chapter 2, the RMB NDF market is highly speculative in nature while the onshore spot 
market is highly regulated with a membership-based trading platform and strict entry 
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requirements. The two markets are still rather distinct in terms of market participants, trading 
purposes and market functions, thus volatility contagion effects are not detected in the post-
reform period using our data sample.  
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4. Summary and Conclusion 
The July 21 reform and the ensuing reforms in the foreign exchange market abandoned the de 
facto currency peg and introduced certain flexibility in the RMB exchange rate and opened up 
the domestic foreign exchange market in a way to allow an interaction between this market 
and other markets, especially the offshore NDF market.  
 
Preliminary graphs and statistics indicate/show salient differences in the two markets 
dynamics before and after July 21, 2005. Both the mean and volatility of the onshore spot rate 
changes jumped in the post-reform period, so did the volatility of the NDF rate change, 
though to a lesser degree. Furthermore, the stationarity of the onshore spot rate series found in 
the pre-reform period no longer holds after the reform. Deeper analyses of the market 
dynamics in the post-reform period were carried out with a co-integrating relationship or 
long-run equilibrium relationship between the onshore spot rate change and the NDF rate 
change identified by the Johansen co-integration test, reflecting the impact that the reform had 
on the inter-market relations. Two-way Granger causality proved the presence of feedback 
effects in both directions between the offshore NDF market and the onshore spot market. An 
AR-ARCH (1) model for the NDF rate change and a GARCH_t (1, 1) model for the spot rate 
change were constructed and attested to the strong mean spillover effects from the NDF 
market to the onshore spot market as well as from the onshore spot market to the NDF market 
with volatility spillover effects between the two markets still absent. 
 
From these results, we can conclude that the insulation of the onshore spot market is clearly 
broken after the introduction of a series of reforms measures around July 21, 2005 when the 
market access is broadened, the trading arrangement is supplemented with a market-making 
and quote-driven system, the ban on outward capital flows is gradually lifted, the central bank 
relegates part of the control to market forces and the exchange rate increasingly reflects 
market supply and demand. Taken together, these reforms have enhanced and will further 
strengthen the inter-relation and mutual influences between the onshore spot market and the 
offshore market. Even though the volatility contagion effects remain obscure, the possibility 
can not be ruled out that this effect will emerge in the future with further deregulation and 
liberalization, so the regulators should be on guard. At the current stage, the onshore spot 
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market is found to have a larger influence on the offshore market than the other way around, 
but which market will dominate in the future remains to be seen. 
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Appendix 1: Figures and Tables 
Figure A.1.1 Organization of China’s Foreign Exchange Market 
 
* There were no non-financial enterprises trading in the inter-bank foreign exchange market until March 2006. 
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Figure A.1.2: First difference of NDF and Spot closing rates, pre-reform period 
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Source: Reuters. 
 
Figure A.1.3: First difference of NDF and Spot closing rates, post-reform period 
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Source: Reuters. 
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Figure A.1.4: Percentage change of NDF and Spot closing rates, pre-reform period 
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Source: Reuters. 
 
Figure A.1.5: Percentage change of NDF and Spot closing rates, post-reform period 
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Source: Reuters. 
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Table A.1.1 : F and Related Statistics for the Sequential Reduction from VAR (5) to VAR (2) 
Null Hypothesis  Maintained Hypothesis 
System SC AIC   VAR (5) 
VAR 
(4) 
VAR 
(3) 
VAR 
(2) 
VAR (5) -16.34 -16.73 1494.57      
         
VAR (4) -16.40 -16.73 1489.87  
2.223 
[0.07] 
(4,328) 
   
         
VAR (3) -16.50 -16.75 1488.21  
1.509 
[0.15] 
(8,328) 
0.783 
[0.54] 
(4,332) 
  
         
VAR (2) -16.60 -16.78 1486.49  
1.285 
[0.23] 
(12,328) 
0.80361 
[0.60] 
(8,332) 
0.827 
[0.51] 
(4,336) 
 
         
VAR (1) -16.65 -16.76 1480.42  
1.717 
[0.04]* 
(16,328) 
1.526 
[0.11] 
(12,332) 
1.903 
[0.06] 
(8,336) 
2.985 
[0.02]* 
(4,340) 
Notes:   
1.   denotes log-likelihood while SC and AIC are Schwarz and Akaike information criteria respectively.  
2.  F statistic tests the null hypothesis in the first column against the maintained hypothesis indicated in the 
second row. The tail probability is reported in square brackets and the degrees of freedom for the F statistic in 
parentheses.  
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Skewness (
1b ) and Excess kurtosis ( 2b ) are defined in (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) respectively: 
 
(A.2.1) 31 3/ 2
2
m
b
m
, in which 
1 1
 1/ ( ) , 1/
T T
i
i t t
t t
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(A.2.2) 42 2
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m
b
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The AR 1-j test is the Lagrange-multiplier test for j
th
 order residual autocorrelation under the 
null hypothesis that there is no residual autocorrelation (i.e. that the errors are white noise). 
The ARCH 1-j test tests for j
th
 order autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in the error 
term (Engle, 1982). The null hypothesis is that γ= 1( ,... )j =0 in (A.2.3). 
 
(A.2.3) 2 21
1
( ,..., )
j
t t t j i t i
i
E u u u c u  
 
The Hetero test is based on White (1980) and involves an auxiliary regression of the estimated 
residual on the original regressors and all their squares with a null hypothesis of unconditional 
homoscedasticity and the alternative that the variance of the error term depends on regressors 
and all their squares. Hetero-X test is a general test for heteroscedastic errors with a null that 
the errors are homoscedastic or if heteroscedasticity is present, it is unrelated to the 
regressors. Normality test assumes a null of normality, using χ2 critical values. A more 
detailed explanation of different diagnostic tests can be found in Doornik and Hendry (2001). 
 
 
 
 
